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CLAIMS FOR MONEY IN THE CLAIMS COURT
David M. Cohen*
The Tucker Act' in relevant part provides: "The United States Claims
Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the
United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress
or any regulation of an executive department . "..."2 At first glance, the
Tucker Act appears remarkably similar to the statute which confers "federal
question" jurisdiction upon the federal district courts.3 A reasonable expec-
tation, therefore, is that the courts would construe the two statutes in a simi-
manner. This has not been the case, however. In general, the "federal
'on" jurisdiction of the district courts extends to any " 'substantial
,ounded "directly" upon federal law.' ,4 In contrast, courts have con-
3 the Tucker Act to vest jurisdiction in the Claims Court only to enter-
tain "claims for money." 5
* Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
Justice. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and not those of the De-
partment of Justice.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988). In the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Congress
merged the Appellate Division of the Court of Claims with the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals to create the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Congress simultaneously cre-
ated the Claims Court, which is vested with the trial jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. See S.
REP. No. 97-275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981) (explaining that the changes were necessary
"to fill a void in the judicial system by creating an appellate forum capable of exercising na-
tionwide jurisdiction over appeals in areas of the law where Congress determines there is a
special need for nationwide uniformity ... and to provide an upgraded and better organized
trial forum for government claims cases"). Decisions of the Court of Claims are binding upon
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Claims Court. Therefore, the term
"Court of Claims" as used in this Article refers to the successor courts, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and the Claims Court. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d
1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (adopting as precedent the laws of the Court of Claims and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals); United States Claims Court General Order No. 1.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). This section establishes that "[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." Id.
4. WRIGHT, MILLER.& COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562, at 46
(2d Ed. 1984) (quoting Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 157, 168 (1953)).
5. Eg., United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1, 18 (1889). With respect to earlier versions of
the Tucker Act, see, for example, United States v. Alire, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 573, 575-76 (1868).
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Claims for money may take two forms. A plaintiff may seek the return of
funds that it has paid to the government as a result of a mistake or as the
result of an allegedly illegal exaction. Alternatively, the plaintiff may seek
the payment of money that it contends the government is required to remit
and that the government has failed or refused to pay.
This Article first discusses what constitutes a monetary claim. It then
describes what types of statutes evidence an intent to require monetary pay-
ments. The Article concludes that, although courts have not clearly stated
how to determine if a remedy is adequate, the availability of an alternative
remedy is a major factor in determining Claims Court jurisdiction over stat-
utory monetary claims.
I. DEFINING MONETARY CLAIMS
In 1915, the United States Supreme Court held, in United States v. Emery,
Bird, Thayer Realty Co.,6 that a claim for a refund of a tax was a monetary
claim founded upon a statute and thus was within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims.7 The Court offered no reason for its decision. Instead, the
Court merely stated that an argument that the Court of Claims lacked juris-
diction rested upon the "inadmissible premise" that the Tucker Act was to
be "construed strictly and read with an adverse eye."' This appears to be
the only Supreme Court decision to indicate that the Tucker Act should be
construed liberally.
The Court of Claims in Clapp v. United States9 extended the Emery, Bird,
Thayer decision. In Clapp, the court held that it possessed jurisdiction to
entertain "a claim to recover an illegal exaction made by officials of the Gov-
6. 237 U.S. 28, 30 (1915). Members of the Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Good Company
organized the Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Company to acquire and lease the property of the
dry goods company eighteen months before the passage of the Corporation Tax law of 1909.
Id. The Collector of the United States assessed a corporate tax against the realty company,
which the members paid under protest. Id. at 31. The Supreme Court held that merely ac-
quiring and leasing the property did not constitute "doing business" under the statute, and
affirmed the district court's finding for the realty company. Id. at 31, 33.
7. Id. at 32. The suit was actually instituted in a district court pursuant to the "Little
Tucker Act," current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988). The act granted concurrent jurisdic-
tion to the district courts and the Court of Claims in cases involving claims for less than
$10,000. Some early cases held that the Court of Claims could entertain a suit to recover
money illegally extracted or retained because the claim was based on an "implied contract" to
make restitution. E.g., Kirkendall v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 766, 769 (Ct. Cl. 1940).
8. Emery, Bird, Thayer 237 U.S. at 32; see Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 228
(1901).
9. 117 F. Supp. 576 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 834 (1954). The Maritime Adminis-
tration had compelled the plaintiff in Clapp to pay $7,500 to the government for the release of
his obligation to operate a vessel under United States law. Id. at 578. The plaintiff paid the
money under protest and asserted that he was entitled to a full refund. Id.
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ernment, which exaction is based upon a power supposedly conferred by a
statute .... "10 Although it provided a number of quotations from different
cases to support that conclusion, the court did not explain its reasoning in
any detail. "
The Emery, Bird, Thayer and Clapp cases are important because they hold
that the Claims Court's jurisdiction extends to a claim for money which has
been unlawfully exacted 2 or retained' 3 without regard to the nature of the
statute upon which the United States relied to collect or retain the funds.
The situation is different where a plaintiff claims entitlement to money that
the United States has refused to remit. 4 In the latter case, the nature of the
statute upon which the plaintiff relies is significant because the United States
clearly is not required to respond with the payment of money in every case
in which the government violates a statute.'" Instead, the relevant inquiry in
each case is whether Congress intended to create a monetary damages rem-
edy for violation of the statute in question.
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I)16
illustrates the type of inquiry which the courts view as appropriate in cases
where the plaintiff challenges the government's refusal to remit money owed.
In the General Allotment Act of 1887,' the act in question in Mitchell 1,
10. Id. at 580.
11. Id. at 579-80. The Court, however, did state that the case holding was a "best esti-
mate of the present law." Id. at 580.
12. "Exacted", in this context, refers to the situation in which the government requires
the payment of a sum, the plaintiff pays the sum, and the plaintiff then institutes suit to recover
the sum paid. Eg., Alaskan Arctic Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States, 831 F.2d 1043 (Fed.
Cir. 1987), later proceedin& 19 Cl. Ct. 211 (1990).
13. "Retained", in this context, refers to the situation in which the government owes a
sum to a plaintiff but for some reason refuses to pay all or some of it to the plaintiff. Eg.,
United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989).
14. "Remit", in this context, refers to the situation in which a statute requires the govern-
ment to pay money under certain conditions and, although the plaintiff contends that he meets
those conditions, the government refuses to pay the money. Eg., Diamond v. United States,
213 Ct. Cl. 766 (1977).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400-02 (1976) (finding that the federal
Classification Act did not provide a money damages remedy through retroactive reclassifica-
tion of civil servants improperly classified). A claim for "just compensation" resulting from
the federal government's alleged taking of a person's property is a claim "founded upon the
Constitution." Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933). For all practical purposes, the
takings clause of the fifth amendment is the only federal constitutional basis for bringing a
claim in the Claims Court. Cf Wright v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 416, 420-21 (1990).
16. 445 U.S. 535 (1980) ("MitchellI"), on remand, 664 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1981), aff'd, 463
U.S. 206 (1983). In Mitchell I, individual Indians and two Indian groups alleged that the
federal government's mismanagement of Indian lands constituted a breach of trust. Mitchell
v. United States, 591 F.2d 1300, 1300-01 (Ct. Cl. 1979), rev'd, 445 U.S. 535 (1980), on remand,
664 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1981), aff'd, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
17. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 349, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1988).
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Congress authorized the President to allot to each Indian residing on a reser-
vation a specified amount of land found within the reservation. The act spe-
cifically provided that the United States retain title to the allotted lands "in
trust for the sole use and benefit" of the allottees. 8
Several allottees instituted suit in the Court of Claims alleging, inter alia,
that the United States' management of the land failed to ensure the highest
possible return to the allottees. 9 The Court of Claims held that it possessed
jurisdiction to entertain the suit.2" The court reasoned that establishing the
United States as a trustee to administer a trust corpus for the benefit of speci-
fied beneficiaries demonstrated Congress' intent to require the United States
to respond in damages if the United States breached the fiduciary duty
which common law imposed upon a trustee.21
The Supreme Court, in its first review of this case, disagreed.2 2 In the
Court's view, the legislative history of the General Allotment Act clearly
indicated that Congress intended for the United States to
'hold the land.., in trust' not because it wished the Government
to control use of the land and be subject to money damages for
breaches of fiduciary duty, but simply because it wished to prevent
alienation of the land and to ensure that allottees would be immune
from state taxation.
23
The Supreme Court therefore concluded that the Claims Court lacked juris-
diction over the suit.
24
Another case in which the Court held that a statutory claim was not
within the jurisdiction of the Claims Court is United States v. Testan. 25 In
Testan, government employees contended that they were receiving the salary
of the civil service grade GS- 13 positions to which they had been ap-
pointed.26 They alleged that they performed the same work as employees
18. 25 U.S.C. § 348.
19. Mitchell, 591 F.2d at 1301.
20. Id. at 1304.
21. Id. at 1301-04.
22. Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. 535, 538-40 (1980).
23. Id. at 544 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1988)).
24. Id. at 545-46. The Supreme Court held that the General Allotment Act did not cre-
ate a fiduciary responsibility in the federal government for the management of the lands, but
rather provided for a limited trust. Id. at 542, 546.
25. 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
26. Id. at 393-94. Since United States v. Wickersham, 201 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1906), a
statute requiring the payment of a particular salary to a federal employee occupying a specific
position in the civil service has been considered a money mandating statute. Thus, prior to the
Civil Service Reform Act, a federal employee removed from a civil service position could insti-
tute suit in the Court of Claims alleging that the removal was unlawful and, thus, a nullity.
See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 442, 444-45 (1988). Therefore, the employee could
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who were serving in civil service grade GS-14 positions, which garner higher
salaries than the salaries the claimants received. According to the claimants,
the payment of higher salaries to GS-14 employees violated the principle of
the Classification Act,27 which required classification of civil service posi-
tions in a manner assuring "equal pay for substantially equal work."2 The
claimants requested the Court of Claims to award them the difference be-
tween the GS-13 and GS-14 level salaries.29
The Supreme Court in Testan did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs'
claims. Rather, the Court held that the Classification Act was not a statute
upon which a claim within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims could be
founded and, therefore, that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit.30
In support of its conclusion, the Court noted that the equal pay for substan-
tially equal work principle was located in the Classification Act's "purpose"
section.3 The Court further observed that no provision in the statute per-
mitted an award of backpay to a person who had been erroneously classi-
fied.32 In addition, the Court emphasized that the plaintiffs had not been
appointed to positions at the GS-14 level and, in accordance with the estab-
lished rule for federal employees, were not entitled to the benefit of a posi-
tion until appointed to that position. Furthermore, the Court stated that
neither the Classification Act nor its legislative history indicated that Con-
gress intended-,o alter the general rule."
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Hambsch
v. United State. provides a third, and more recent, example of the appropri-
ate analysis to-determine whether a federal statute confers jurisdiction upon
the Claims Coart to hear a claim that the government has unlawfully refused
to remit money.3 4 The case involved a statute providing that a federal law
enforcement officer shall not be placed on sick leave for absence due to in-
also assert an entitlement to the salary that the statute required to be paid to the employee
occupying the position from which the employee was allegedly removed. Id.
27. 5 U.S.C. § 5101 (1988).
28. Testan, 424 U.S. at 394, 399 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 5101(l)(A)).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 401-03.
31. Id at 394.
32. Id at 399-400, 407.
33. Id. at 402. The Court also expressly disapproved the reasoning of the Court of Claims
in Pettit v. United States, 488 F.2d 1026 (Ct. Cl. 1973), and Allison v. United States, 451 F.2d
1035 (Ct. Cl. 1971). Testan, 424 U.S. at 405. In those two cases, the Court of Claims held that
it could entertain a suit based upon an executive order which provided that the policy of the
United States was to ensure equal employment opportunities for employees without discrimi-
nation. Pettit, 488 F.2d at 1031; Allison, 451 F.2d at 1035, 1039.
34. Hambsch v. United States, 848 F.2d 1228 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 857 F.2d 763 (Fed. Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1054 (1989).
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jury in the line of duty.35 Mr. Hambsch claimed that, while employed as a
federal law enforcement officer, he had been injured in the line of duty and
that, as a result of the injury, he had not reported for duty.36 The employing
agency determined that if Mr. Hambsch had been injured, the injury had not
occurred in the line of duty.37 Therefore, Mr. Hambsch was placed on sick
leave for the days that he failed to report for work.31 Mr. Hambsch insti-
tuted a suit in the Claims Court challenging the agency's decision, 9 but the
Claims Court held that the employing agency had correctly determined that
he was not injured in the line of duty.'
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sua sponte, raised the issue
of the Claims Court's jurisdiction,4' and held that the Claims Court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Hambsch's claim. 42 The appellate court found
that the statute upon which the plaintiff had relied was not a "money man-
dating" statute.4 3 A federal employee accumulates a specified number of
"sick leave" hours each pay period. If the employee misses work due to
illness or injury, the number of hours of absence is deducted from the em-
ployee's accumulated hours of sick leave. As long as the number of hours
missed is equal to or less than the number of hours of accumulated sick
leave, the employee receives his regular salary during the absence. If the
number of hours of absence exceeds the number of hours of accumulated
sick leave, however, the employee is not paid for the hours exceeding accu-
mulated sick leave."
35. Id. at 1230; see 5 U.S.C. § 6324 (1988).






42. Id. A claim that an agency erroneously deducted certain hours of absence from an
employee's sick leave account, which the agency should have counted as administrative leave,
may not constitute a claim for money within the jurisdiction of the Claims Court. In United
States v. King, the Secretary of the Army retired a colonel based upon length of service. 395
U.S. 1, 1 (1969). The colonel asserted that the Army should have based his retirement upon
disability, which would have entitled him to an income tax exemption. Id. at 1-2. The
Supreme Court stated that the colonel must have reduced his claim of erroneous classification
of his retirement to a judgment from a court other that the Court of Claims before the latter
court could award the relief he sought. Id. at 3. The Supreme Court thereby reaffirmed that
the Court of Claims' jurisdiction was limited to awarding money damages and that it had no
power to grant a declaratory judgment. Id. at 3-4. Accordingly, a claim that an agency
wrongfully debited a plaintiff's accumulated hours of sick leave may require equitable relief
that the Claims Court cannot award.
43. Hambsch, 848 F.2d at 1232.
44. 5 U.S.C. § 6324 (1988).
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If a law enforcement officer is injured in the fine of duty, and must miss
work as a result of the injury, the officer might exhaust accumulated sick
leave solely as a result of the line- of duty injury. As. a result, an officer could
lose pay if he subsequently became ill, not in the line of duty, and was re-
quired to excuse himself from work due to the illness.. Congress apparently
believed that this result would be unfair because law enforcement is a haz-
ardous occupation, and the risk of sustaining an injury in the. line of duty is
greater for a law enforcement officer than for other federal employees. Con-
gress enacted the statute at issue in Hambsch to prevent the, unfair result
which could occur if an injury occurring in the line of duty' depleted an
officer's accumulated sick leave.45
Apparently, the court of appeals believed that the statute involved in
Hambsch was not "money mandating" because it provided only that an of-
ficer injured in the line of duty should not be placed on sick leave.46 The
statute did not specifically provide that the officer should be placed on ad-
ministrative leave in lieu of sick leave; a federal employee on administrative
leave continues to receive salary.47 According to the court of appeals, the
failure to include the latter provision in the statute evidenced a lack of an
intent to compensate an officer who was erroneously placed on sick leave.48
This conclusion is correct because a reversal of an erroneous decision placing
an employee on sick leave would not automatically require placement of the
employee on administrative leave. Rather, by the terms of the statute, Con-
gress could have intended either to require the officer either to return to duty
despite the injury, or to place the officer in a "leave without pay" status.
Therefore, the court determined that, because the reversal of an erroneous
decision under the statute would not necessarily result in the payment of
money, the statute was not money mandating.
Notably, three Justices dissented from the denial of a petition for a writ of
certiorari that Mr. Hambsch filed in a companion case.4 9 According to the
dissenting Justices, the legislative history presented sufficient evidence to
45. Hambsch, 848 F.2d at 1230.
46. Id at 1231.
47. 5 U.S.C. §§ 6321-6325 (1988).
48. Hambsch. 848 F.2d at 1231-32. Thus, if the statute had provided that any officer
injured in the line of duty shall not be placed on sick leave but, instead, shall be placed on
administrative leave, then the statute would have clearly evidenced an intent to pay money to
an officer who was erroneously placed on sick leave.
49. Hambsch v. United States, 490 U.S. 1054, 1054-58 (1989) (O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy, JJ., dissenting). The only difference between the two cases is that Mr. Hambsch
contended that he had suffered a psychological injury in the line of duty in the first case and
that he had suffered a physical injury in the line of duty as the result of a motorcycle accident
in the case in which he filed the petition for writ of certiorari. See Hambsch v. United States,
857 F.2d 763 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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conclude that Congress intended an officer injured in the line of duty to be
placed upon administrative leave.50 Thus, an erroneous decision to place an
officer on sick leave in violation of the statute would necessarily lead to the
payment of money.
51
II. STATUTES WHICH REQUIRE MONETARY PAYMENTS
Congressional intent, as expressed in a particular statute, determines
whether the United States is subject to money damages as a result of the
government's violation of a statute. For example, in Eastport Steamship
Corp. v. United States,52 the Court of Claims attempted to describe the type
of statute which, according to past decisions, evidences a congressional in-
tent to require a money payment to redress a violation of the statute." The
court held that it possessed jurisdiction to entertain a claim founded upon a
statute if "the particular provision of law relied upon grants the claimant,
expressly or by implication, a right to be paid a certain sum."-"
This formulation expresses the corollary principle that the Claims Court
does not possess jurisdiction to entertain claims for damages resulting from
"misgovernment, L e., for misfeasance in the exercise of peculiarly govern-
mental functions."" Yet, the formulation provides little guidance as to the
factors which courts are to apply in determining whether a particular statute
provides a basis for a claim cognizable in the Claims Court. For that gui-
dance, reference to other decisions is necessary.
50. Hambsch 490 U.S. at 1057-58. A fourth Justice issued a memorandum emphasizing
that the denial of "a petition for a writ of certiorari is not a ruling on the merits of any question
presented by the petition." Hambsch, 490 U.S. at 1054 (Stevens, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 1057 (O'Connor, Scal;x, and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
52. 372 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1967). In Eastport, the Maritime Commission denied plaintiff
permission to sell a ship to a Danish buyer. At the time of the denial, the Commission was
formulating a policy of charging money for approvals of sales to foreigners which the Court of
Claims later held illegal. Id. at 1006-07. The plaintiff located an Israeli purchaser who offered
$200,000 less than the Danish purchaser. Id. at 1006. The Court of Claims awarded the
plaintiff the $10,000 that the plaintiff had paid for approval, but denied recovery of the differ-
ences in purchasing prices because Congress did not intend for the Shipping Act to compensate
for commercial injury. Id at 1009, 1010-11.
53. Id. at 1007-11. Smithson v. United States, 847 F.2d 791 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1004 (1989), is the contractual analogue of EastporL
54. Eastport, 372 F.2d at 1007.
55. United States v. Mitchell, 664 F.2d 265, 280 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (Nichols, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), aff'd, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
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A. Monetary Character and Nondiscretionary Payments
A statute which possesses; a monetary character" and requires a nondis-
cretionary payment57 is more likely to) be viewed as money mandating. As
the court noted, in Eastport, the Claimua Court's jurisdiction would encom-
pass a claim premised upon "some specific-provision of law [that]. embodies, a
command to the United States th pay the: pl'intiff some money, upon proof
of conditions which he is said tb meet.""8 For example, a statute which.
provides that the Secretary of the Treasury,,is to pay one hundred dbllars to
every citizen who fulfills conditions X and' Y is clearly money mandating.
Accordingly, the Claims Court would possess jurisdiction to entertain a suit
in which a claimant contended that it had filflled conditions X and Y but
that the Secretary of Treasury had failed to pay one hundred dollars.5 9
The leading case on the question of the nature of a money-mandating stat-
ute expresses the view that the statute must require the payment of a "cer-
tain sum.'6° This does not appear to be a necessary requirement, however.
No case has held that the Claims Court lacks jurisdiction where a claimant.
relied upon a statute which requires the payment of money, but does not
require the payment of a "certain sum." The same is not true with respect to
the discretionary nature of the payment. A discretionary element in the stat-
ute precludes Claims Court jurisdiction of a claim based upon that statute.
The statute must require a payment upon the satisfaction of certain terms in
the sense that the payment must not be discretionary if 'the conditions set
forth in the statute are fulfilled.
61
B. Authority to Provide Monetary Payments
A court will be more likely to hold that a statute is money mandating if it
provides for the payment of money "in itself."62 Where a claimant seeks to
establish a violation of one statute to obtain the payment of money, as pro-
56. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983) ("Mitchell H") (defining a statute
which possesses a monetary character as one which "can fairly be interpreted .as mandating
compensation by the Federal Government for the damages sustained"); see United, States v.
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402-03 (1976) (same).
57. See Adair v. United States, 648 F.2d 1318, 13227(Ct. CI. 1981) (holding that a neces-
sary prerequisite for Court of Claims' jurisdiction is that-the claimant have a vested right to
payment under a statute or regulation and that a discretionary, bonus is not sufficient).
58. Eastport, 372 F.2d at 1008.
59. See, e.g., Campbell v. United Staters 107 U.S. 407, 4 lB (1883) (allowingi claimant to
bring suit in the Cburt of Claims against the Secretary, of the Treasury to recover a, teffnd of
import duties pursuant to a statute which provided for a refund when goods manufactured
from imported materials were exportl).
60. Eastport 372 F.2d at 1007.
61. See, e.g., Adair, 648 F.2d at 1322.
62. Eastport, 372 F.2d at 1008.
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vided in another statute, the claimant, in reality, is seeking a declaratory
judgment under the first statute, and the Claims Court lacks jurisdiction to
grant that relief.63 For example, the Claims Court would lack jurisdiction to
entertain a military officer's claim that the government erroneously retired
him because of age instead of disability so that he may subsequently file a
claim for a refund of the taxes remitted on his retirement pay.
64
A related principle, although not directly concerned with the nature of the
statute upon which a claim is founded, is that a claimant must seek money
which is "presently due." The Claims Court lacks jurisdiction to issue a
declaratory judgment. It therefore lacks jurisdiction to hear a claim that, at
some time in the future, the claimant will be entitled to a payment of money.
For example, in Bowen v. Massachusetts,65 the Supreme Court considered
whether a district court possessed jurisdiction pursuant to the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) 66 to entertain a suit by a state seeking to compel
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to reimburse the state for cer-
tain expenditures that the state made as a participant in the Medicaid
program.
67
In deciding this question in the affirmative, the Court discussed the juris-
diction of the Claims Court, and expressed doubt as to whether that court
would have possessed jurisdiction to entertain the suit." The Court ex-
pressly noted that the Secretary already had paid money to the state and had
determined to recoup some of those funds as an overpayment." Neverthe-
less, the record did not clearly indicate whether, at the time the state
brought the suit, the Secretary had withheld some of the funds otherwise
payable to the state.7 ° If the Secretary had not withheld funds from the state
contemporaneously with commencement of the suit, Claims Court jurisdic-
tion would have been doubtful. This result follows because the Secretary
would not presently have owed money to the state.
The Hambsch case provides another example of the requirement that the
government currently owe the plaintiff money.71 Although the decision ap-
pears to be based upon a determination that the statute involved was not
"money-mandating," depending upon the actual facts presented, the case
might have been decided upon the basis that no money was presently due.
63. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 3 (1969).
64. Id.
65. 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
66. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988).
67. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 882.
68. Id. at 905.
69, Id. at 909-10.
70. Id. at 887 n.9, 907 n.44.
71. See supra notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
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Assuming that the statute provided that a law enforcement officer injured in
the line of duty should be placed on administrative leave 72 instead of sick
leave, a reversal of a decision to place an officer on sick leave would simply
result in a correction of the officer's record to reflect that the officer received
the salary accrued during his absence and that the officer was on administra-
tive leave. The hours erroneously debited as a result of his absence from
work should then be restored to the officer's sick leave account. In this cir-
cumstance, a reversal of the agency's decision that the officer had not been
injured in the line of duty would not necessarily result in a monetary pay-
ment to the officer. In fact, the only result of the correction would be an
increase in the officer's sick leave account which is available for future use.
If, however, as a result of the erroneous decision to place the officer on sick
leave, the officer exhausted his accumulated sick leave and was placed in a
leave without pay73 status for the remainder of his absence from work, then
a reversal of the decision would require a monetary payment to the officer.
If the officer had exhausted the sick leave to which he was entitled, then a
reversal of the agency's decision would result in a conversion of the number
of hours of leave without pay to hours of administrative leave. Because an
employee on administrative leave continues to receive compensation, that
conversion would result in a payment of the officer's salary for the hours
which had previously been considered to constitute hours on leave without
pay.
74
In contrast, if the officer had not exhausted his accumulated hours of sick
leave due to absence as a result of an injury allegedly suffered in the line of
duty, then a reversal of the decision that the officer had not been injured in
the line of duty would not require the immediate payment of additional sal-
72. "Administrative leave" refers to "an authorized absence from duty with pay without
charge to leave." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL LAW MANUAL,
TITLE 11-LEAVE, 5-1 (3d ed. 1990).
73. "Leave without pay" refers to "a temporary nonpay status and absence from duty."
Id. at 5-36.
74. A reversal of the line of duty determination could also have monetary consequences if
the officer remained in government service and if, at some time in the future, the officer ex-
hausted his sick leave. In that event, the officer would be placed on leave without pay for the
duration of his absence from duty due to illness because the previous injury in the line of duty
exhausted the officer's sick leave, Upon depletion of sick leave, the officer could institute suit
in the Claims Court because a line of duty determination would result in a retroactive correc-
tion of the officer's record to reflect an increase in the number of sick leave hours. The number
of hours during which the officer was absent on leave without pay would then be subtracted
from the officer's increased sick leave account. Therefore, the officer would receive his salary
for the hours formerly charged to leave without pay but now "covered" by the hours of sick
leave newly credited to the officer's sick leave account. Thus, a reversal of the erroneous ad-
ministrative decision would result in a payment to him of his salary notwithstanding his ab-
sence from duty until the officer's sick leave account was again exhausted.
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ary. Instead, only an increase in the number of hours credited to the officer's
sick leave account would result. In that case, the officer arguably could not
institute suit in the Claims Court seeking to reverse the line of duty determi-
nation because a reversal would have no immediate monetary consequences.
This principle effectively forces such claimants to institute suit in a district
court pursuant to the APA. In a district court, the officer could challenge
the administrative decision to deduct the hours of absence from the officer's
sick leave account. If the officer succeeded, the hours previously deducted
from the officer's sick leave account would be restored. If the officer's em-
ploying agency failed to restore the hours of sick leave and if, subsequently,
the officer were placed on leave without pay because he had exhausted his
hours of sick leave, the officer has two options. First, the officer could file a
motion for contempt if the district court issued an injunction requiring the
agency to increase his sick leave. Second, if the officer does not obtain an
injunction, then he could, based on the district court judgment, institute a
suit in the Claims Court to obtain a payment of salary for the hours of ab-
sence from work that were erroneously charged to leave without pay.
C. Adequate Remedy in an Alternative Forum
Courts also appear to be more likely to hold that a statute will support a
suit in the Claims Court if the claimant had no other "adequate" remedy.
Of course, if Congress has made available a remedy other than a suit in the
Claims Court and has explicitly or implicitly indicated that this remedy is to
be exclusive, suit in the Claims Court will be precluded." Where there is no
indication that Congress intended the other remedy to be exclusive, how-
ever, the courts will examine the other remedy to determine whether that
alternative is "adequate."
For example, in its decision in United States v. Mitchell, (Mitchell I),76
the Court considered whether certain statutes gave rise to a claim cognizable
in the Claims Court if the United States failed to manage the land to obtain
the best return possible. The statutes at issue provided that the United
States should manage land held in trust for certain Indians taking into ac-
count the needs and best interests of the beneficiaries."' The United States
75. E.g., United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 452-53 (1988); Matson Navigation Co. v.
United States, 284 U.S. 352, 360 (1932). With respect to claims founded upon the fifth amend-
ment for compensation resulting from an alleged taking of the claimant's property, Congress
must exhibit "an unambiguous intention to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy." Preseault v.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 914, 922 (1990) (quoting Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1019 (1984)).
76. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
77. Id. at 211 (the statutes at issue governed timber management, roadbuilding and rights
of way, Indian funds, and government fees).
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contended that the availability of an action in the Claims Court was unnec-
essary because suits in the district courts for declaratory, injunctive, or man-
damus relief could remedy the government's violation of the various
statutes. 8 The Court rejected this argument and held that the Claims Court
possessed jurisdiction on the grounds, among others, that suits in the district
courts often could be instituted only after considerable damage had occurred
and could not provide the beneficiaries with compensation for that past
damage.79
In contrast, if a court is convinced that a remedy in another court is "ade-
quate," the courts will be more inclined to hold that the Claims Court lacks
jurisdiction. Thus, in Testan, the Court noted that the plaintiffs could insti-
tute suit in a district court seeking declaratory, injunctive, or mandamus
relief to remedy the government's improper classification of their civil ser-
vice positions, and this alternative appeared to influence the Court's ultimate
holding that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction. 0
Neither Mitchell II nor Testan involved the APA and its relationship to
the Tucker Act. Since 1976, however, when Congress amended the APA to
waive the sovereign immunity of the United States,8' the relatidship be-
tween these two statutes has become important. The APA provides that a
person adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action may obtain judicial
review of that action.8 2 These suits are instituted in the district courts pur-
suant to the federal question statute.
8 3
The APA provides that it does not apply to suits for "money damages"
8 4
and that it does not apply if there is an "adequate remedy" in another
court.8" The Supreme Court addressed these two provisions in Bowen v.
Massachusetts. 8 6 Bowen presented the question of whether a district court
possessed jurisdiction to entertain a suit seeking to prevent the United States
from withholding reimbursement to a state of amounts allegedly due to the
state for certain expenditures the state had made under the Medicaid pro-
78. Id. at 237.
79. Id at 227-28. Similarly, the Court has held that the availability of a suit in a district
court against an officer would not prevent the Claims Court from entertaining a suit against
the United States. Eg., Hatzlach Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460 (1980); United
States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U.S. 28, 30 (1915).
80. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 403-04 (1976).
81. P.L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-703
(1988)).
82. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
84. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
85. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
86. 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
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gram. 7 After holding that the suit sought specific relief and not money
damages within the meaning of the APA, s" the Court considered whether
the APA precluded the suit because the state possessed an adequate remedy
in the form of a suit in the Claims Court. 9
The Court concluded that the availability of a suit in the Claims Court
was doubtful, and that even if the availability of a suit were assumed, a suit
in the Claims Court would not provide an adequate remedy.9° While the
Court provided a number of reasons for this conclusion, including the inabil-
ity of the Claims Court to provide injunctive relief and the possible need for
a court which possessed familiarity with state law,9" the Court's discussion
of the state's financial position if it were required to institute suit in the
Claims Court92 is the most relevant to this Article.
If the state were required to institute suit in the Claims Court, it would
have to await an actual withholding of funds by the government. At that
point, the state could allege that the government had failed to pay money
which was presently due. 9a In this situation, the state would be required to
continue to provide the program at issue with its own funds pending comple-
tion of the litigation or to abandon the program until the litigation was con-
cluded. The Court apparently concluded that this dilemma would
necessarily make state planning for future expenditures difficult, if not im-
possible, and the Court was unwilling to place the state in this position.94
Viewed from this perspective, the result in Bowen is simply the corollary
of the result in Mitchell II. In Mitchell II, the Court held that a prospective
remedy in the district court was not an adequate alternative to a suit in the
Claims Court because a prospective remedy would occur too late to prevent
potentially irremediable damage and would not provide the claimants with a
remedy for those past damages.95 In contrast, the Bowen Court concluded
that a remedy in the Claims Court was inadequate because it would be avail-
able only upon the occurrence of certain conditions: the withholding of
funds, which would cause an injury to the state, and the inability to plan
87. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
88. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893.
89. Id. at 901-08.
90. Id. at 901.
91. Id. at 905, 907-08.
92. Id. at 905-07.
93. See id. at 914 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 3
(1969)).
94. Id. at 905-07.
95. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 227-28 (1983).
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future expenditures during the pendency of the litigation, which the pay-
ment of money would not fully remedy. 96
III. CONCLUSION
The adequacy of alternative remedies, a suit in a district court, a suit in
the Claims Court, or an administrative remedy, has always been an impor-
tant factor in determining the jurisdiction of the Claims Court to entertain a
suit for money founded upon a statute. Unfortunately, the courts have not
provided much guidance as to the criteria which are to be applied to deter-
mine whether a remedy is adequate. Instead, the courts have simply tended
to describe the consequences if a claimant were required to institute an ac-
tion in one court or another, and have then stated the conclusion that the
consequence renders the remedy adequate or inadequate. Accordingly, the
emergence of the appropriate criteria will have to await future developments.
96. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 901-08.
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